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1. Small- and Large-Scale Gold Mining: Who Competes for What?
Most gold mining companies in western Africa have settled in areas where artisanal gold min-
ing (ASM2) was already practiced before the companies came to the place. The relations between 
artisanal gold diggers and the mining companies are often conflictive, which is usually explained 
by a supposed competition for access to the same resources. However, it was proven that the inde-
pendent artisanal gold miners and the large-scale multinational mining companies do not compete 
for the same gold (Hilson 2011). The first ones are technically constrained to limit their digging 
to surface reefs or alluvial placers, while mining companies extract large quantities of ore from 
deep reefs (Hilson and Yakovleva 2007: 102; USAID 2005: 3). Recent and recurrent incidents on 
gold mining fields in Guinea and elsewhere have shown that, despite their interest in different 
kinds of deposits, artisanal gold miners were continuously labelled “illegal robbers” when they 
were caught on the lease of an active gold mining company. The criminalization of artisanal min-
ing is part of the everyday life of gold diggers in a non-formalized context of work, mainly due to 
administrative constraints and the high costs involved in making their activity enter the licensing 
system (Fisher 2007: 739). The informality of their practices is usually not much objected to by 
the state authorities as long as they do not interfere with the same spaces of the large-scale gold 
mining companies. 
However, the topic has recently evinced some interest also from the media, mainly after several 
accidents taking place on the territory of gold mining companies that caused the death of many 
artisanal gold diggers.3 In Upper Guinea (Siguiri), the company AngloGold Ashanti was forced 
to react and reaffirm its position as legal owner of the land vis-à-vis the “illegal robbers mainly 
coming from outside”. These accidents have accelerated the deployment of new forms of control 
by the concerned company, mainly through its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs. 
After having spent a total of one year with artisanal gold diggers in the region of Siguiri, where 
AngloGold Ashanti operates since 2004, in this chapter, I present how artisanal miners interact 
with the neighbouring spaces occupied by AngloGold Ashanti. I will describe three forms of typi-
cal encounters that appeared successively and analyse them with regard to the application of CSR 
1 A Review of this chapter was undertaken by Prof. Katja Werthmann.
2 According to the global report on artisanal and small-scale mining (Hentschel et al. 2002), Artisanal and Small-Scale 
Mining (ASM) refers to informal mining activities carried out using low technology or minimum machinery.
3 In November 2008 and February 2009, 13 and 23 artisanal gold miners died in two shaft collapses that occurred on 
the lease area of the mining company AngloGold Ashanti in the region of Siguiri, in Guinea. The accidents were 
disseminated by media in and beyond the region (A.F.P. 13.11.2008).
1Published in Thomas Niederberger et al. (Eds), The Open Cut: Mining, 
Transnational Corporations and Local Populations, pp. 187-204, 2016,
which should be used for any reference to this work
programs. I rely on a political ecology approach, which seeks to understand how the control over 
specific resources is organized. This becomes particularly visible in situations where different 
stakeholders meet and/or negotiate their access to resources—in this case, gold ore. Therefore, I 
examine different forms of encounters that take place between a gold mining company and the 
surrounding gold diggers, who are either local residents or itinerant artisanal gold miners. The 
analysis of this interaction shall help in better understanding of how measures undertaken by a 
gold mining company, in order to control spaces of extraction, are perceived by artisanal gold 
diggers, and what consequences these measures have for the gold diggers.
First, the context of the case study will be described with regard to the history of gold mining 
and the related movements of people in the region. A special focus is placed on the social organi-
zation of artisanal mining at the local level. Second, I will briefly present the research methods 
and the theoretical framework. Third, I will describe three forms of typical interactions that I 
respectively call expulsion, tolerance and interference. Finally, the implications of CSR programs 
towards the social organization of ASM will be discussed, especially concerning the fragmenta-
tion of the social organization of artisanal gold mining.
Map 1: Location of Siguiri in the Kankan Region of Guinea.
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2. Gold Mining in Bouré: Long-Standing Practices and the
Standardization of Encounters
Gold mining has always been powerful in attracting people from faraway places to the re-
gions of extraction. The most known and widely documented examples are the gold rushes in the 
frontier-era in the United States. Similar dynamics can be found in contemporary Africa (Jacques 
et al. 2006 ; Werthmann and Grätz 2012: 11), where the concept of frontier has been adapted to 
grasp the interactions of fortune-seekers with local communities, with reference to migratory 
dynamics and the related social boundaries (Grätz 2004). According to historians, the region 
of Bouré in northern Guinea, where this study was conducted, was already a common venue 
for populations of northern arid areas during the dry season at the time of the Malian Empire. 
Between the 12th and the 16th century, the Malian Empire, which had exclusive ownership on 
the gold nuggets, already relied on a seasonal workforce (Ki-Zerbo and Niane 1991: 195). The 
activity was exclusively conducted during the dry season and strictly depended on the agricultural 
calendar. Whole villages or families left their places of origin for temporary settlements, some of 
which became permanent villages (Herbert 2012: 26-28). Contrary to other areas of Guinea where 
gold deposits have been discovered only recently, the region of Bouré has historically developed 
mainly upon gold mining and numerous waves of “transitory” migrants. Temporary workers were 
traditionally hosted through the institution of tutorat, which is a customary convention that gives 
its beneficiaries a grant of land tenure rights in exchange for continuing gratitude and allegiance 
towards the owner. Sometimes, the benefit includes the provision that the tuteur receives part of 
the production from his “guest” (Chauveau 2007: 66). The institution of tutorat became standard-
ized through hosting practices embedded in migration narratives. These narratives still play an 
important role. First, they shape identities of the local populations through land claims and by 
reference to the first settlers. Second, they serve as a regulation for the immigrant or temporary 
settled populations (e.g. Werthmann 2006). Later, during colonial times, temporary workers kept 
on maintaining regular contacts with artisanal mining settlements where they had established 
prerogatives, in particular through tutorat relations. These dynamics have visible impacts on the 
current social organization, such as the commonality of multilocal households, but have also met 
major changes that I will address later.
Since more than ten years, artisanal gold mining has literally exploded in western Africa— 
both in terms of the number of people engaged in the activity and the extent of the exploited min-
ing fields (Hentschel et al. 2002). On the one hand, the rapidly increasing gold price contributed 
to the attractiveness of the activity among populations that were traditionally not involved in 
mining (for example, urban dwellers and educated people). On the other hand, unemployment in 
urban centres is also a major cause of engagement in the ASM sector (Hilson and Potter 2005). 
Unemployed people often participate in the increasing urban-rural migrations (Beauchemin and 
Bocquier 2004: 2253) or contribute to “return” migrations even if they had never lived in their 
“place of origin” before (Potts 1995). Thus, in the tradition of long-standing circular movements, 
an increasing number of people engage in full-time artisanal gold mining by adopting a mobile 
way of life that allows them to move quickly from one mining field to another without any inten-
tion to settle (Jonsson and Bryceson 2009).
This chapter is concerned with encounters between multinational companies and the surround-
ing populations, comprising both local residents and the above-mentioned itinerant artisanal 
miners. Since the 1980s, these relations started getting increasingly standardized through CSR 
programs. According to Carroll (1999), the shift from mutual avoidance to a sustained and organ-
ized involvement in the social life of the local population was partly due to strong incentives from 
international institutions and NGOs. This position contributed to a rising critique of companies’ 
environmental and social damages. Regular critiques were developed by the NGOs and academ-
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ics about the meagre impacts of measures for the benefit of the local population compared to the 
benefits of legitimizing the presence of extractive multinational companies in developing coun-
tries (for a synthesis: Banerjee 2008). In the mineral extraction sector, Hönke (2010) showed how 
companies used their CSR programs to better control the territories where they were operating. 
Other studies deal with the consequences of these programs for the social life of the concerned 
communities such as conflicts between villages (Frynas 2005: 592) or among villagers (Luning 
2012) when it comes to accessing benefits. Despite an obvious unequal distribution of power, arti-
sanal miners and the concerned communities cannot be considered passive victims. Several case 
studies in the Melanesian context have shown how communities adopted CSR and the develop-
mental discourses on land tenure, to benefit from compensations and CSR investments. Commu-
nities strategically organize in “customary land groups” or create a “landowner” status in order 
to get access to compensation funds of the mining companies or the state, as well as to benefit 
from quota-share through the Ministry of Mines (Filer and Macintyre 2006; Jorgensen 2004). In-
teractions between communities and the mining companies are hence increasingly standardized 
through CSR programs and the related discourses, agents and programs.
Therefore, I propose to analyse encounters between artisanal miners and a gold mining com-
pany, from the miners’ perspective (both locals and itinerants), by taking into consideration the 
existing social boundaries among the gold diggers. The next section describes some specificities 
of the present case study, especially regarding how work is organized in the artisanal mining 
fields in proximity to the concession area of the company. 
3. The Case Study
The present study was conducted in the region of Bouré, 40 kilometers from Siguiri town in
Upper Guinea. Largely known for its important gold deposits, it is the first allocated concession in 
Guinea that was given to a large-scale mining company. First called Société Aurifère de Guinée 
(Ashanti Goldfields Corporation), it then merged with AngloGold in 2004 and became part of 
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. In the region, the company is known as “SAG”. 
SAG started exploiting gold in 1989. The arrival of the company first evoked great expectations 
concerning employment perspectives in the region. Disappointment was equally great, as most 
hired workers were expats and the few available jobs for the local population were physically 
demanding and low-paid. A former employee in the artisanal mines reported: “Salary is so low, 
that with the rush, I finally went back to artisanal mining. Work is very hard too but there [with 
artisanal mining] you can be lucky and you are free.”4 As a consequence of the unsatisfying work-
ing conditions, relations between the company and the population in Siguiri and the villages of 
Bouré rapidly turned conflictive and resulted in frequent strikes by local employees and protests 
by the neighbouring population of Siguiri, among whom many are part-time or seasonal artisanal 
mine workers.
Around the active pits of the company, the soil is drilled by thousands of small shafts made by 
the artisanal gold miners. Those are usually young men who leave their home place to generate 
an income before settling down back home. However, the forms of engagement in the artisanal 
gold mining sector differ, and can be ideally presented by three specific types: First, some miners 
engage in long-term itineraries that sometimes last several years. This implies cutting off most 
family ties and a return is only possible when they acquire recognition in the sector and adequate 
savings to start living on their own. Such miners often refer to mining as a form of “adventure”, 
4 All the quotes in this chapter are from interviews conducted during the fieldwork in Guinea between 2009 and 2012.
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which is a common reference in the migration narratives in western Africa (Bredeloup 2008).
Second, there are miners who engage seasonally or temporarily, usually as part of the household 
strategies of securing livelihood. Such miners often consider mining as a complement to their 
main activity, which is farming. Third, local residents of mining areas usually depend exclusively 
and most often indirectly on gold mining activities. They mainly combine several income gen-
erating activities related to gold mining, except participating directly in the extraction process. 
They invest in mining activities either by owning a shaft, by providing mechanical support, by 
doing business with gold ore, or by offering services in the mining camps; for example, in small 
restaurants and coffee shops, or in stores selling clothes and extraction material. Their autochtho-
nous status, besides owning a shaft, also allows them to be considered as part of the local militia.
Seasonal workers are often hosted by local residents, either through the institution of tutorat 
or through family ties. They usually maintain strong personal networks extending over several 
years. On the contrary, itinerant gold miners settle in temporary mining camps close to the min-
ing fields. The camps can host up to several thousands of people during the dry season and thus 
become major hubs for trade and business for the whole region (Mbodj 2009). Different kinds of 
workers characterize working conditions on ASM extraction sites: First, a team of shaft diggers 
who associate with a local shaft owner, whose responsibility is the maintenance of the team until 
gold is reached. The shaft owner is hence considered a member of the team in the distribution of 
the latter extracted ore, which is divided among the initial stakeholders and washed individually. 
Second, when the ore is finally reached, experienced gold diggers, specialized in underground ex-
traction, called kalayantigilu start joining the initial team and are asked to “take a turn” inside the 
galleries. The work in the tunnels is considered much harder and is usually done by kalayantigilu, 
who sell their workforce and experience from shaft to shaft. They can earn much more than the 
Map 2: Mining area and settlements near Siguiri.
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shaft owners and initial teams as these gold diggers multiply their operations in the best shafts.
In any operation, success can hardly be ensured. This pushes some gold diggers, be they itiner-
ant or not, to try their luck in the neighbouring territories of the mining company, in particular 
when they face difficulties to meet their daily expenses. Because of the mechanized operations 
undertaken by the SAG, rich deposits are accessible easier there. In some places, abandoned ore 
can be conveniently rewashed through ASM and these small quantities can cover daily needs. 
Yet, these operations imply greater risks because of the soil fragility. From the miners’ accounts, 
collapses can be anticipated by listening to and reading the warning signs given by the subsoil. 
However, such skills require time and experience and are associated with the so-called “masters” 
or “officers”.
Fig. 1: Searching for gold in Kintinian tunnel. Photo: Matthieu Bolay.
Between 2009 and 2010, several accidents took place on the territory of the SAG. Shaft col-
lapses caused the deaths of more than 30 artisanal gold diggers and were largely covered in the 
regional media and much farther. In response to these fatalities, the SAG accelerated the “stra-
tegic action plan” of its “community development” plan. The plan officially aimed at providing 
infrastructural support to the neighbouring communities and improving the relations with them.
After briefly describing data collection methods in the next section, I will then present how 
artisanal gold miners active in the area re-interpreted relations with the mining company by pay-
ing special attention to the successive forms of distribution of control over gold mining spaces 
induced by CSR.
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4. Methodology
The field research was conducted during a total of ten months in gold mining areas in Upper
Guinea between 2009 and 2012. More specifically, I collected data in the mentioned region of 
Bouré, where the SAG is settled. Diverse anthropological methods were combined and several 
stakeholders’ perspectives were taken into consideration. The first objective aimed at capturing 
and comparing access strategies to mining resources of itinerant and resident mine workers in 
different locations. Village-managed artisanal mining fields, abandoned artisanal mining fields 
and mining spaces upon the lease of the mining company constituted my main field. I first stayed 
in two miners’ households for two three-month periods where I followed day-to-day activities 
on the neighbouring mining fields. These insights were complemented by 24 interviews with 
male resident and temporary miners. I also interviewed two women but did not include this data 
because of the exceptionality of their experience in the view of the other male interviewees.5 
Interviews mostly focused on miners’ strategies of access to mining resources both formally and 
5 Women make up half of the population living on the artisanal gold mining fields. The division of labor prevents them 
from doing any kind of subterranean work. This makes them less prone to operate in the concession area of the mining 
company.
Fig. 2: Artisanal miners at work in Kofilani Boure. Photo: Matthieu Bolay.
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informally, on their general perception of the mining company, as well as on their interpretation 
of the programs undertaken by the SAG. Complementary interviews were conducted with tom 
bolomas6 and local state officials in order to obtain their perspective on relations among the min-
ers, and between the miners and the mining company. Because of the “tripartite” context that 
this chapter addresses, informal discussions were also held with other local stakeholders such as 
village chiefs, soldiers, employees of the SAG, among whom some had executive positions, and 
two police officers. Those insights were useful to better understand how they interpret the social 
heterogeneity of the mining community, especially in their diverse relations with the SAG. I also 
collected copies of police statements for casualties in the area of Bouré through local informants, 
and reviewed public relations and official statements of the SAG to capture its official position 
toward the “mining community”. 
In my data, the perspective of the artisanal miners has obviously more weight than the one of 
the company, which was almost inaccessible through formal interviews. Some noteworthy studies 
approach the question from this perspective and recall that private firms should not be considered 
as monolithic entities. Strategies rely on personalities and political ties with local state institu-
tions, and are thus often far from the officially stated position of the mining company (e.g., Davis 
and Franks 2011 ; Frynas 2005 ; Kapelus 2002). However, as the main concern of this paper is to 
understand how artisanal miners experience neighbourly relations with the mining company, its 
activities directed toward the “community” and the situations that arise from their encounters, the 
perspective of the mining company is less addressed.
The analysis of the material has been guided by a political ecology approach, which aims at 
identifying inequalities in terms of access to natural resources; in this case, to soils of high grade 
gold ore. Gold is not a renewable resource at human scale and the potential conflict should hence 
not only be considered “environmental”7 but also include its economic and political dimensions 
(Escobar 2006). Natural agency is considered, however, as it obviously affects actions and/or 
reactions both of artisanal miners and of the mining company. For instance, shaft collapses pro-
voke fatalities and attract media coverage and its potential occurrence influences choices of the 
gold diggers. In our case, socio-environmental conflict theory provides a framework focusing 
on conflictive situations in the access to and over resources (for example, high grade ore soils). 
With this framework, we can examine who controls what, who is allowed to decide what and who 
is expected to do what tasks (Little 2007; Robbins 2012). By asking these basic questions, we 
can better understand how the increasing scarcity in gold access due to appropriation by private 
companies and an increasing number of gold diggers leads to conflicts between social entities 
(local and itinerant artisanal miners, artisanal miners and non-miners, artisanal miners and the 
mining company). The three presented cases show that the more cooperative the approach of the 
company toward the “community”, the more conflictive it turns within the targeted community. 
The argument here is that the conflict moves from the tensions between company and the miners 
to tensions between local populations and the miners. The main reason is that the local autoch-
thony conventions are challenged by CSR programs and turned into effective social boundaries in 
the context of work of the artisanal gold miners, by following an approach based on autochthony 
through the interference of CSR programs.
6 Tom bolomas literally means “the ones that hold coercive power” in Maninkakan; they act as a local militia and control 
the artisanal mining fields under the mandate of the village authorities.
7 Contrary to the consequences of mining (e.g., soil degradation) that often lead to environmental conflicts.
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5. From Mutual Avoidance to Interference
Different stakeholders are involved in framing the encounters between the SAG and the arti-
sanal gold miners. This is visible at two different levels. First, the level of decision-making, and 
second, the level of decision-implementation. These decisions mostly concern control over terri-
tory and the application of programs towards the “communities”. The following image refers to 
the main stakeholders and their relations concerning power in decision-making and control over 
working spaces.
 The presence of the state is less dealt with in this chapter, because it is usually limited to 
episodic incursions of agents of the Ministry of Mines in the villages managing artisanal mining 
fields in order to collect taxes. In the everyday relations between the SAG and the gold diggers, 
the state is usually not directly involved, though its representatives at the local level (for example, 
the president of the local government) or the army (in cases of strikes and protests) occasionally 
can play an important role. I examine here three types of encounters between the SAG and the ar-
tisanal gold miners that appeared successively, and reflect the evolution of the company’s strategy 
towards “unwelcome” gold diggers. The three examined cases appeared successively but should 
not be considered isolated steps as they add up and integrate with the previous ones.
Fig. 3: Map of stakeholders.
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5.1 Expulsion: Reactions to the Incursions of the Clandos
Concerning decision-making power, the common understanding in the past years was a simple 
territorial division. On the one hand, the SAG manages its mining lease area. On the other hand, 
the villages, through their authorities and local militia, control the artisanal mining fields. This 
clear divide illustrates well the position of mutual avoidance of the different actors and the “for-
tress strategy” of the SAG that they were applying worldwide before the broadening of the CSR 
(Caroll 1999). Despite this clear territorial divide, artisanal gold miners often cross these lines to 
access the pits of the company where the ore is more easily accessible. Digging the soil in the lease 
of the company is risky on two grounds. First, gold diggers expose themselves to important risks 
of shaft collapses because of soil instability largely caused by drilling and dynamite explosions. 
Second, they also expose themselves to military patrols in charge of controlling the territory; be-
ing caught results in heavy fines and often imprisonment by the local police. Intervention of the 
family and bribes are usually needed for release. 
Incursions can be of two kinds. Initiators are often individuals or small groups of gold diggers 
and sometimes also massive movements of artisanal mine workers benefitting from the temporary 
lack of company control over their licensed areas. Experts in these practices are called clandos 
(“clandestines”) because they operate outside the law and because they have been the main target 
of the patrols. An old man in Balato reports on the common view on clandos: “Ever since the SAG 
is here you have had people digging in their pits. For us (the tom bolomas), it is not a problem if 
they want to try their luck there. If they get caught it is their own responsibility; that is why they 
often go at night. Most of them are in the shafts in the faro8 during daytime and at night they hide 
to get to the [company] pits.” This statement illustrates well how responsibilities in controlling 
the neighbouring spaces of the lease and the faro are distributed. From the perspective of the local 
8 The faro is the artisanal gold mining field.
Fig. 4: Miners’ camp in Bouré. Photo: Matthieu Bolay.
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population, entering the lease of the SAG to get gold ore is certainly a risky operation but is not 
morally condemned. 
While clandos usually operate with maximum discretion, the territory of the SAG is, on certain 
occasions, massively occupied by all kinds of artisanal gold miners, especially when strikes and 
protest emanating from Siguiri town lead to the temporary closure of the mine. This was the case 
in 2009 when hundreds of unemployed youths blocked the road connecting the processing factory 
to the town for several days in order to demand more company investment in the provision of jobs 
and in access to services such as health care or electricity supply. A small summary of that day 
spent with local gold diggers in the pit will illustrate the classic expulsion strategy of the company 
towards the gold diggers. 
“We knew for two days that strike would start on Saturday. In Siguiri town, most youths at 
the coffee shop intend to join the march to Koron. In the neighbouring villages, plans are 
more concerned with occupying the pit than blocking the road. I hence decide to remain in 
Fatoya for the night in order not to be blocked by the protest. On Saturday morning, I join 
Seydoujan to go to the pit, which is already totally occupied when we arrive. Most people 
collect left-over ore on the edges of the pit, while others attempt to dig small trenches at 
the bottom of the pit. Women do instantaneous washing and fill bags with the ore that 
looks most promising. In a few hours, the whole population of the neighbouring mining 
fields of Fatoya, Boukaria, Kofilani and Kintinian seems to have rushed and replicated the 
organization of the faro in the unoccupied pits. No later than one hour after our arrival, 
Seydou spots three military vehicles approaching fast towards one of the edges of the pit. 
At this same moment, almost all trenches have already emptied and everyone is running 
in the opposite direction. Seydoujan advises not to run and to walk quietly out of the pit. It 
is just expulsion, he says, they cannot arrest everyone so they usually arrest no one. When 
we come back to Balato, Seydoujan explains that this same scenario, called ratissage by 
people, has been repeated several times during the year and is increasingly being coordi-
nated with the protests from Siguiri town.”9
Clandos incursions and ratissage do not rely on the same purposes and circumstances. Clandos 
incursions are part of the everyday life occurring on the fuzzy borders of the SAG territory, while 
massive movements of people in the pits depend on protests organized in the town. However, they 
both provoke the almost instantaneous expulsion of the gold diggers out of the concession areas 
of the company. “Expulsion” clearly affirms the property of the SAG upon a certain territory by 
controlling it with the support of contracted soldiers. Decisions are unilaterally taken by the SAG 
and intended to prevent any confrontation with the gold diggers by symbolically reaffirming the 
figure of the fortress.
5.2 Tolerance: the Illusion of Uncontrolled Zones
As a reaction to the numerous accidents that occurred on the lands managed by the SAG and 
which resulted in the exercise of its responsibility towards the clandos operating on the mining 
lease, the company developed a more cooperative approach towards the artisanal gold miners. 
Agents of the SAG started roundtables with the neighbouring village authorities and related tom 
bolomas committees in order to redefine the controlled territory of the company. According to 
members of the tom bolomas, the company used the following arguments: an increasing number 
9 Adapted from personal fieldnotes.
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of people were caught on the mining lease and their imprisonment was being criticized by the 
local elites. Further, fatalities of artisanal miners on the company’s territory would damage its 
image. The proposed solution was a withdrawal of the patrols from areas that had been fully 
exploited by the company so that artisanal miners would be free to access these zones. While the 
message was well received by the gold diggers, it posed several problems for village authorities. 
First, artisanal mining fields represent important incomes for village authorities and families 
owning the land. They could lose parts of their incomes if gold diggers started operating mas-
sively on spaces where tom bolomas would not be allowed to collect taxes. Consequently, the 
local militia could not control these new spaces dedicated to artisanal mining. Second, members 
of the local militia mentioned that the risk of shaft collapses was higher in places that had already 
largely been exploited by industrial means such as drilling and use of explosives. 
This new approach of the company towards the artisanal gold miners hence suggests a shift in 
the control of the area and a redistribution of responsibilities. From controlling all the concession 
territories, the company decided to limit control to the active zones of exploitation. Villages, ruled 
by tom bolomas, remained in charge of controlling the artisanal mining fields. Yet, no responsibil-
ity was defined for the remaining zones located within the company’s lease where artisanal min-
ing was now tolerated. There are two consequences of this policy of tolerance in the day-to-day 
practices of artisanal gold miners. First, people in the most vulnerable positions started digging 
these areas, where ore was now easily accessible but in lower quantities. In particular, this activ-
ity became an option to find day-to-day basic incomes for young itinerant mine workers without 
either a stable network of peers or mining experience. Second, accidents in those remaining zones 
increased. Personal reports based on the local Red Cross and police reports show that out of 200 
fatalities the majority occurred outside of the artisanal mining fields controlled by the local mili-
tia. Third, SAG did not report these casualties occurring on their licensed lands. This contributed 
to enhancing the company’s image in its yearly report. Further, SAG could escape from accusa-
tions concerning human rights violations, as such incidents are unwelcome for a company that has 
subscribed to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (AngloGoldAshanti 2010). 
Fig. 5: Abandoned mining site occupied by artisanal miners in Bougaria Bouré. Photo: Matthieu Bolay.
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The question of responsibility for what could appear as a hecatomb is well summarized by one 
of the heads of the local militia: “Of course, it is too dangerous [to dig shafts in the remaining 
areas of the company]. We often come here and tell them to get out of the shafts, but the following 
day they are back. We already have to manage the village plots and decide where people can dig 
and not dig, but there it is the SAG which decides. We don’t take taxes there; it is not for the vil-
lage, so we cannot prevent their coming”. 
This unambiguous statement shows that the decision of the company to tolerate the venture of 
the gold diggers in abandoned pits involves the inability (and somehow unwillingness) of local 
authorities to extend their management upon these areas. Controlling space is a way to control 
access to resources, but it is also a way to regulate work in a hardly formalized environment. In 
consequence, the withdrawal of the SAG from the control of some segments of its territory fos-
ters the appearance of unregulated spaces of work where the most vulnerable workers operate at 
greater risk in order to secure their livelihoods. Though not explicitly mentioned, practice shows 
that space is regulated by boundaries based on experience and locality in this case. Newcomers, 
who can neither count on their experience, nor on strong ties with local residents to access the 
good spots on the artisanal mining fields, are more vulnerable and more prone to turn towards 
remaining zones. 
5.3 Interference: Intervention in the Social Life of Artisanal Mining
A third type of encounter between the mining company and the artisanal gold miners can 
be identified through the implementation of CSR programs in the “community”. CSR programs 
(public awareness on environmental issues, investment in community relation improvement, in-
vestment in health care) extend the scope of influence of the SAG from the spaces of gold extrac-
tion to the neighbouring villages and mining camps. Following the “collaborative” trend initiated 
in 2009, the company, for example, invested in electricity infrastructure for the “communities”. 
At the beginning, the question of who constituted the targeted “community” had to be solved. 
On the one hand, understanding the community as an equivalent for the “village” meant put-
ting aside the miners’ principal problem that most of the villagers were not local residents. On 
the other hand, focusing on the “community of artisanal miners” signified formal recognition of 
their presence and work also on the remaining areas that were legally still under the responsibil-
ity of the company. The 2009 consultancy study brought the following definitions of artisanal 
miners “groups” such as “two separate artisanal mining groups operating at Siguiri—the local, 
traditional orpailleurs10 and the artisanal miners who come from outside the Siguiri area and, in 
most cases, are not Guinean. Specifically, [the report] highlighted the existing tension and conflict 
between these two groups who compete for the same mining sites”.
Further, in the report, the so-called “traditional orpailleurs” are associated with regular artisa-
nal mining in the villages’ places, while in contrast, “strangers” are said to work “outside the tra-
ditional system (…) within the mine’s lease area” (AngloGoldAshanti 2009). As discussed earlier, 
artisanal mining is historically embedded in practices of mobility, which standardized, through 
the institution of tutorat, the “multi-locality” category, and the networks of peers going beyond 
the single mining field. The provided definition contributes to the identification of a legitimate 
community to interact with, and consequently to the exclusion of non-native mine workers from 
the targeted group despite the close relations that were traditionally maintained between them.
10 Orpailleur is a French term for the gold prospectors.
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 Based on this definition of “mining community”, the company, through its consultancy office, 
addressed the administrative and customary “natives” as representatives to manage the distribu-
tion. Unsurprisingly, electrification quickly turned into a divisive issue between recognized na-
tives, whose access was guaranteed through CSR programs, and the considered allochthonous, 
who had to pay significant taxes to get access to electricity on the informal market. Thus, people 
who were established for long and gained their autochthonous status within the social space of 
the artisanal mining fields — for example, through the right to own a shaft, to participate in the 
plots sharing, or to integrate the tom bolomas team — were excluded from access to new infra-
structure services. In other words, they were considered strangers again, which impacted upon 
their artisanal mining activities and meant their exclusion from decision-making processes in the 
management of corporate investment benefits, which only focused on the villages.
Hence, from the control of workspaces, the SAG, through its CSR policy, controlled specific 
infrastructures and interfered in the social life of both itinerant and local resident artisanal min-
ers. Decisions were mainly taken by consulting local authorities and implementation occurred 
by transferring allocation tasks to local elites. In consequence, itinerant gold diggers were pro-
gressively deprived of some of their established prerogatives, which caused conflicts among the 
artisanal miners. For instance, ordinary energy providers were suddenly accused of cheating on 
the prices and of imposing an unequal competition. These artisanal miners often bring their own 
gas infrastructure from other regions and thus competed with the locals who were developing an 
informal energy market through their access to company-installed electricity lines. As these com-
panies were from Burkina Faso, Mossi-speaking artisanal mine workers were quickly and vio-
lently expelled. The same occurred with the management of ore mills and automatic sluices that 
often came from Malian markets. Also other machine owners who were not residents of the place 
had to justify their linkage to “native” families in order not to be expelled. For instance, a tom 
boloma established for long in the region argued in reaction to the autochthony politics of village 
authorities: “They took me in the militia because I had been a student and I can write. First they 
were saying no because I was a stranger. For me, it is twenty years that I am living here; I know 
the mines, how to read, to write…of course, I can be a tom boloma. But now, again, some say I 
should not remain in the team. Although I do not even have a machine, some tell me to leave...”
Thus, the unequal allocation of access to energy resources based on autochthony has weakened 
the usual conventions regulating the presence of itinerant gold diggers. The application of an ex-
ternal categorizing discourse hence made social boundaries effective through the interference of 
revised property rules on the technical elements needed for the production of gold in the artisanal 
sector.
In this third type of encounters, the conflict of gold diggers opposing the mining company is 
externalized to the field of artisanal gold mining, where the company indirectly rules by control-
ling access to energy. By creating facilities in the extraction and treatment of gold through energy 
supply and by letting remaining zones be uncontrolled, the SAG provides a new framework for 
the surrounding artisanal mining fields where the issue of access to land is partly replaced by the 
one of access to energy. The transfer of allocation tasks to the natives’ authorities also contributes 
to the autochtonization of work relations between resident and itinerant workers. Without control-
ling space stricto sensu, the company through CSR programs thus interferes in the social organi-
zation of artisanal mining and partially prevents the appearance of gold diggers in its active pits.
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6. Discussion and Outlook
In this chapter, I have shown three successive typical forms of interaction between a gold min-
ing company and the surrounding artisanal miners from their perspective. Each of these encoun-
ters highlights different ways of controlling spaces for gold extraction and the subsequent division 
of power in the control of working spaces. The three types of interactions appeared successively 
between 2009 and 2012 but should not be considered as isolated steps. Each new type integrates 
with the previous one(s) in such a way that the control over working spaces is progressively re-
shaped during those three years. The first type of encounter (expulsion) relies on a clear division 
of control between the area of the mining concession, on the one hand, and the artisanal mining 
fields, on the other. Coercive power is transferred to the army on the territory of the SAG and to 
the local militia on the artisanal mining fields. Artisanal miners caught on the licensed land are 
expelled in the best case or transferred to the police for imprisonment. The second case (tolerance) 
appeared after several controversies about the responsibility of the company concerning fatalities 
that occurred upon its lease. Control is here withdrawn from leftover zones, which remain free 
of access to the artisanal miners. Fatalities drastically increase in those places and often affect 
young, inexperienced and poor itinerant mine workers. In the third type (interference), the former 
division of control of working spaces remains the same. However, the energy supply to the “com-
munity” (the natives in the given definition) by the company through CSR programs allows the 
SAG to interfere in the social organization of artisanal mining. The consequence is a return to 
conflicts and autochthony-based claims and the expulsion of numerous itinerant workers from the 
artisanal mining fields. 
From those three interrelated types, it appears that the company diversified the types of control 
over the territory, and even extended it to the surrounding gold diggers. Direct control is main-
tained and strengthened in the active pits. Besides, soft control is deployed beyond the licence 
area through energy supply, extending also to the spaces of artisanal extraction. Through this, 
village authorities gain power in the zones of artisanal extraction, upon which they reactivate au-
tochthony boundaries that usually only concerned the living spaces (camps and villages through 
tutorat). Finally, the transfer of allocation tasks to the village authorities implies that the responsi-
bility of the company in sensitive zones is removed and potential conflict is partially externalized 
to the artisanal miners. Thus, it appears that the more the company and the gold diggers interact, 
the more conflictive the relations among the gold diggers become. Also, the case study shows 
that the control over territories is gradually reshaped in order to maintain a strict coercive control 
in the active industrial mining areas without regard to the original lease of the company, while 
facilitating access to abandoned areas. Finally, the control of energy resources contributes to the 
autochtonization of work relations among artisanal gold miners despite a long history of estab-
lished conventions of work and hosting between local and itinerant miners.
Finally, the study suggests that the common understanding of environmental conflict to grasp 
conflictive situations between large-scale mining and small-scale mining is not fully applicable 
to the case presented here. As mentioned by Escobar (2006), political and economic dimensions 
must be taken into consideration to understand better the motives for control in specific territo-
ries. While the issue is understood from both miners’ and company’s points of view, as a concern 
of access to and control over spaces of work, the motives to control them differ. From the miners’ 
perspective, the question is essentially an economic concern of accessing gold ore, depending on 
the resources they have (for example autochthon status, stable network of peers and experience). 
On the other side, the mining company does not face effective loss of gold ore but acts at the local 
level out of political concern to maintain its image, freed from responsibility for the accidents oc-
curring upon its land. Moreover, the CSR initiatives contribute in externalizing potential conflicts 
away from the responsibility of the company.
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In contrast to other studies that focus on the relations between companies and the state, I have 
centred the analysis on the relations between a mining company and the surrounding collectives 
to understand how the evolving categorization of spaces dedicated to artisanal gold mining and 
control over spaces contributed to increased conflicts among the gold diggers. The extension of 
social boundaries based on autochthony conventions to the working sphere of the mining fields 
has in particular one main consequence. From the gold miners’ point of view, be they locals or 
itinerants, the application of CSR programs de facto opens a new register for justification for the 
procurement of the needed resources such as energy for the extraction of gold (Boltanski and 
Thévenot 2008).
In a context of rising worker mobility—facilitated by networks in a process of professionali-
zation despite the informality of the practices in legal terms—the current state of the art raises 
questions regarding the echoes of these modes of governance at the level of the state. For instance, 
while autochthon discourses are not new in western Africa, their political uses by state actors has 
often contributed to generate tensions (Bayart 2001; Ceuppens 2005; Chauveau 2000). Neverthe-
less, it is interesting to recall that, since the new Guinean presidency of Alpha Condé in November 
2010, the official discourse on mining resources has changed: while companies are pressed to 
renegotiate their concessions and to give higher revenues to the state, the artisanal mining sector 
also becomes involved in terms of potential incomes. The first speech given by the Presidency to 
the national association of small-scale gold and diamond diggers highlights this new trend. After 
regretting the “lack of organization” of the gold diggers, the Presidency warned them against 
neighbouring countries taking advantage of the situation. This statement well illustrates how non-
nationals are designated as responsible for all kinds of problems in the ASM sector at different 
institutional levels despite their historical involvement in artisanal gold mining and the massive 
presence of Guinean mine workers in the neighbouring countries. Thus, in most governmental of-
fices concerned with artisanal mining, “foreigners” are also referred to as appropriating national 
wealth. 
Far from considering the transnationality of the artisanal mining sector, the official position 
regarding ASM participates in the growing discourse based on autochthony at the level of the 
state to the point of extending this divide to the category of nationality. Thus, as long as the 
mobile component of gold extraction and the proper modes of organization of this exploitation 
system are not taken into consideration by decision-makers and local administrators, the results 
are growing tensions among the workers. Moreover, it is known that artisanal mining activities 
and the related movements of people constantly arose in the last decade (IOM 2012 ; UNECA 
2003). The traditional seasonal displacements of workers from their home places to the mining 
areas are complemented by long-term displacements to more and farther mining fields spread 
beyond national borders. For most mine workers, adopting an extreme mobile way of life has 
become an inherent condition for work in the artisanal mining sector, and as such forms a neces-
sary component of this socio-technical system. Therefore, the categorizations emanating from the 
CSR programs based on a generic understanding of belonging through the national-ethnic lens 
when assessing transnational work practices only partly reflect the issues of the workers on the 
ground. Rather, they generate supplementary conflict potential among them by externalizing the 
competition for resources.
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